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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Extradition1 from the United States is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 31842 
and, with limited exception, by treaty.3  Ordinarily, the process is 
initiated by a request from the foreign country to the Department of 
State.4  Because a formal request is time consuming and a fugitive is 
 1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 474, at 556-57 (1987) (“Extradition is the process by which a person charged 
with or convicted of a crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and 
returned for trial or punishment.”).  
 2. Section 3184 provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United 
States and any foreign government . . . any justice or judge of the United 
States, or any magistrate judge authorized so to do by a court of the United 
States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, 
may . . . issue [a] warrant for the apprehension of the person . . . charged [with 
having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any 
of the crimes provided for by treaty or convention], that he may be brought 
before such justice, judge, or magistrate judge, to the end that the evidence of 
criminality may be heard and considered. 
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); see also United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (“In the United States, the procedures for extradition are governed by 
statute.”).   
 3. See In re Lahoria, 932 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (“International 
extradition proceedings are governed both by statute . . . and by treaty.”); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3181 (2000) (identifying countries with which the United States has bilateral 
extradition treaties).  Comity is an exception which allows for the return of third country 
nationals—persons who are not citizens, nationals, or residents of the United 
States—absent a treaty, provided certain conditions are satisfied.  § 3181(b); see also 
Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975) (“International extradition is 
governed only by considerations of comity and treaty provisions.”).  See generally David 
P. Warner, Bringing White-Collar Criminals to Justice—Fugitive Apprehension and 
Return and Obtaining Evidence Abroad, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 171, 174 (2003) (“The legal 
basis [for extradition], with very limited exception, is grounded on a bilateral or 
multilateral treaty.”).  There are, of course, other ways to acquire jurisdiction over 
fugitives—“[t]he processes of exclusion, deportation, abduction, and rendition or 
surrender all play a role, together with the historic practice of informal modes of delivery 
of fugitives by one state to another.”  Valerie Epps, The Development of the Conceptual 
Framework Supporting International Extradition, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
369, 372 n.12 (2003).  See generally Ethan A. Nadlemann, The Evolution of United 
States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 813, 857-82 (1993) (discussing alternatives to extradition). 
 4. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“Extradition is ordinarily initiated by a request from the foreign state to the Department 
of State.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 612 (1997), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00612.htm [hereinafter 
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL] (discussing role of the State Department);  John T. Parry, 
No Appeal: The U.S.—U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty’s Effort to Create Federal 
Jurisdiction, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 543, 546 (2003) (“Any nation that 
has entered into an extradition treaty with the United States may make a formal 
diplomatic request for extradition.  The State Department reviews the request and 
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likely to flee if he learns of it,5 most treaties provide for the provisional 
arrest of fugitives in urgent cases while the request is perfected.6  The 
Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) reviews 
the request for the provisional arrest warrant and, assuming it is 
sufficient, forwards it to the United States Attorney for the district where 
the person sought to be extradited is located.7  The United States Attorney 
then files a complaint in support of an arrest warrant.8  This complaint is 
presented to a federal magistrate or judge.9
After the person sought to be extradited is apprehended, the requesting 
state provides the United States government with the additional information 
required to carry out the extradition under the treaty through a formal 
request, which then leads to an extradition hearing.10  If the judicial officer 
generally forwards it to the Department of Justice, which sends it to the relevant local 
U.S. Attorney’s office.”) (footnote omitted).   
 5. See Harold Gill Reuschlein, Provisional Arrest and Detention in International 
Extradition—A Survey of Practice and Procedure, 23 GEO. L.J. 37, 38 (1934) 
(discussing the rationale underlying provisional arrest in international extradition).  
 6. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-15.230 (1997), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/15mcrm.htm 
[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL] (“Because the time involved in preparing a formal 
request can be lengthy, most treaties allow for the provisional arrest of fugitives in urgent 
cases.”); see also Duran v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 622, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“In order 
to avoid the flight of a defendant during preparation of a full formal request, many extradition 
treaties permit a provisional arrest to be made upon receipt of an informal request.”).  
 7. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-15.700 (noting how OIA will 
review a request for sufficiency and then forward it to the appropriate district); Jeffrey 
M. Olson, Note, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause Standard for Provisional 
Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 161, 169-70 (1998) 
(“The extradition process generally commences when a requesting state issues a 
Request for Provisional Arrest to the requested state.  The primary purpose of 
provisional arrest is to detain fugitives who are likely to flee once they become aware 
of proceedings to extradite them.”) (footnotes omitted).  If no provisional arrest 
warrant is involved, OIA will review the formal requisition and then forward it to the 
appropriate district.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-15.230. 
 8. See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 615 (“[I]n urgent cases, 
the prosecutor immediately drafts a complaint for provisional arrest and executes it 
before a magistrate judge or district judge in the district where the fugitive is located.  
The judicial officer issues a warrant under the authority of the treaty and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3184.”). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000). 
 10. Id. (noting that purpose of apprehension after issuance of warrant is so that the 
person charged “may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate judge, to the 
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.”); Lis Wiehl, 
Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional 
Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 729, 752 (1998) (“[M]ost extradition laws and treaties provide that the 
alleged fugitive may be arrested and temporarily detained for a period of time to enable 




“deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge”11—which in 
extradition proceedings means probable cause12—then he must certify 
the same to the Secretary of State, who will review the case and 
determine whether to issue a warrant for the surrender of the person 
sought to be extradited.13  Although there is no direct appeal from the 
the requesting State to furnish the necessary documentation in support of its request for 
his extradition.”) (quoting 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 920 
(1968)); Olson, supra note 7, at 172 (“After executing the provisional arrest request, the 
requesting state furnishes the United States with any additional information that is 
required for extradition under the governing statute and treaty.”). 
 11. § 3184.   
 12. See In re Drayer, 190 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1999) (“An extradition 
proceeding is not a forum in which to establish[] the guilt or innocence of the accused; 
rather, the sole inquiry is into probable cause.”); In re Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 467 (9th Cir. 
1998) (“[S]ection 3184 authorizes federal district judges to decide whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the potential extraditee committed an offense covered by a 
given extradition treaty.”); Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(“In essence, the court must analyze if there is probable cause to believe that the 
individual committed acts alleged in the extradition request.”).  See generally Steven 
Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of 
Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 198 (1980) (“The requesting 
country bears the burden of establishing probable cause to believe that the accused 
committed the charged offense.”). 
 13. See § 3184 (stating a judicial officer “shall certify the same . . . to the Secretary 
of State, that a warrant may issue . . . for the surrender of such person . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3186 (2000) (“The Secretary of State may order the person committed under section[] 
3184 . . . to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government.”); see also 
Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Secretary of 
State has final authority to extradite the fugitive, but is not required to do so.  Pursuant to 
its authority to conduct foreign affairs, the Executive Branch retains plenary discretion to 
refuse extradition.”).  Commentators agree that the Secretary of State will seldom reject 
an extradition request after a judicial finding of extraditability.  See John G. Kester, 
Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1486 (1988) (“There is 
little incentive for anyone in the State Department to refuse an extradition request after a 
court has allowed it.  If extradition is then refused by the State Department, it is likely to 
be for reasons of policy and expediency rather than considerations of fairness or 
extradition doctrine.”); Lubet & Czackes, supra note 12, at 199 (“Despite . . . broad 
discretion, the Secretary has in fact seldom overruled a court decision in favor of 
extradition.”); John T. Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 
VA. J. INT’L L. 93, 96 (2002) (“In practice . . . the Secretary rarely exercises discretion, 
perhaps because the needs of diplomacy outweigh the concerns of individuals who may 
have committed crimes.”); Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition 
Applications, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 277, 288 (2002) (“Although the State Department 
has the choice to refuse to extradite, even after a court has issued a certificate of 
extraditability, refusal is an exceedingly rare occurrence.”); Elzbieta Klimowicz, Note, 
Article 15 of the Torture Convention: Enforcement in U.S. Extradition Proceedings, 15 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 183, 197 (2000) (“[T]he probability of having the Secretary of State 
refuse to surrender an extraditable fugitive because of inadmissible evidence is very low.  
In fact, in the few instances where the Secretary actually refused to surrender such an 
individual, the evidentiary findings of the magistrate were not questioned, only his treaty 
construction.”) (footnote omitted). 
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magistrate or judge’s decision,14 review of the order is available through 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.15
In the last thirty years, one of the legal issues relating to foreign 
requests for extradition which has received increasing attention is the 
role that “probable cause,” in the Fourth Amendment sense, plays in 
connection with the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant.16  In other 
words, when the magistrate issues a provisional arrest warrant, must he 
find probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed the crime 
underlying the extradition request, or probable cause that the fugitive has 
been charged with an extraditable crime by the requesting country? 
This Article, which is divided into three parts, analyzes the developing 
case law in this area.17  First, because the probable cause standard is 
found in the Fourth Amendment, the Article briefly analyzes how that 
standard has been applied by the courts in criminal cases.18  Next, the 
 14. See Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1228 n.11 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(“There is no direct appeal from extradition decisions.”); Bozilov v. Seifert, 983 F.2d 
140, 142 (9th Cir. 1992) (“An extradition order cannot be directly appealed.”); Ahmad v. 
Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1065 (2d Cir. 1990) (“An order granting or denying section 3184 
certification is not appealable.”).   
 15. See Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 748 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Decisions 
of an extradition court are not directly reviewable but may be challenged collaterally by 
a petition for habeas corpus.”); Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“Habeas corpus is the normal method of challenging an extradition order, such an order 
being unappealable.”).  In a habeas proceeding, a petitioner may challenge “whether the 
magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offence charged is within the treaty and, by a 
somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that 
there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”  Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 
U.S. 311, 312 (1925); accord Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1997); Wigen, 910 F.2d at 1064-65.  Under 
28 U.S.C. § 2253, a final order in a habeas proceeding is subject to review by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the circuit where the district court is located.  See In re Artt, 
158 F.3d at 468-69.   
 16. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 744 (“Historically, [one] of the more important 
procedural anomalies of the law . . . in extradition[] [has] been . . . the government’s 
ability to obtain a provisional arrest warrant for an international fugitive without having 
to make an evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe that the fugitive committed 
the crime charged . . . .”).   
 17. For ease of reference, the Article frequently refers to a fugitive challenging the 
request for his or her extradition as “petitioner.”  The article also refers to decisions from 
United States magistrates and district judges at extradition hearings as decisions of the 
“court.”  But see Parry, supra note 4, at 550 (“[T]he magistrates and district court judges 
who preside over extradition hearings are not ‘courts’ for purposes of Article III, 
precisely because their decisions are subject to executive review.”). 
 18. As further explained in the text below, extradition proceedings are not 
considered criminal prosecutions.  See Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 543-44 (1st Cir. 
1987).  The protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, however, apply in 




Article discusses the application of the probable cause standard at 
extradition hearings, a practice which is well established.  Lastly, the 
Article explores how courts have analyzed challenges to provisional 
arrest warrants. 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.19
The first clause of the amendment is directed against unreasonable 
searches and seizures; the second clause establishes that probable cause 
is the governing standard for an arrest or search warrant.20
It is well established that searches and seizures “conducted outside the 
judicial process, without approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”21  In the criminal 
context, to the extent searches and seizures are permitted without a 
warrant, they will generally be considered reasonable if supported by 
probable cause.22
both the criminal and the civil context.  See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 
(1967) (“It is . . . anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully 
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal 
behavior.”); Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642, 647 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(“[A] ‘seizure’ may occur in both civil and criminal contexts.”). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 20. See Freeman, 242 F.3d at 648 (noting existence of “two separate and 
independent clauses” and that “[n]othing in the text suggests that warrants are required 
for every search or seizure, nor is the existence of a warrant a sine qua non for a 
reasonable search or seizure. . . .”); see also United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 799 
(7th Cir. 2001) (“During the last 50 years the Supreme Court has understood the [first] 
clause of the fourth amendment . . . to require warrants in some circumstances as essential to 
the ‘reasonableness’ of particularly intrusive searches, such as those into dwellings.”).  
See generally Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: 
Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 508 
(2004) (“[O]ngoing debate [exists] over whether the ‘reasonableness’ or the ‘warrant’ 
clause should have primacy in interpreting how the Fourth Amendment should be 
applied.”). 
 21. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
 22. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1(a), at 4-5 (3d ed. 1996).  
Exigent circumstances will support a warrantless search and seizure if there is probable 
cause for the intrusion.  See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41-42 (1963).  A warrant also 
is not necessary to search a car if the police have probable cause to believe that it 
contains contraband or evidence of a crime.  See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49 
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The Supreme Court has observed that the probable cause standard “is 
a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that 
has been found for accommodating . . . often opposing interests.”23  In 
other words, “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment 
of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”24  These probabilities “are 
not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of 
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal 
technicians, act.  The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what 
must be proved.”25
While probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search “contain 
different inquiries,”26 it has been “generally assumed by the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts that the same quantum of evidence is required 
whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause 
to search.”27  Additionally, “the standards applicable to the factual basis 
supporting the officer’s probable-cause assessment at the time of the 
(1970).  Similarly, the police may arrest a person without first procuring a warrant if they 
have probable cause.  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975). 
Some searches and seizures are not subject to probable cause or the warrant 
requirement. The police, for example, may briefly detain and frisk a person for 
investigative purposes, without a warrant or probable cause, if they have a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person may be armed and 
presently dangerous.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  Routine searches at the 
border are not subject to any warrant requirement, probable cause, or reasonable 
suspicion.  See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).  A 
search incident to an arrest does not require probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  See 
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).  Searches conducted pursuant to 
consent do not require a warrant or probable cause.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 219 (1973).  Lastly, outside the criminal context, “special needs” may make 
the probable cause and warrant requirement impracticable.  See City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
 23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
 24. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 
366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or 
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the 
totality of the circumstances.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) 
(noting that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are “fluid concepts that take their 
substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being 
assessed.”). 
 25. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175. 
 26. Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 27. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 3.1(b), at 6.  As a result, “discussions by courts of 
the probable cause requirement often refer to and rely upon prior decisions without 
regard to whether these earlier cases were concerned with the grounds to arrest or the 
grounds to search.”  Id. 




challenged arrest and search are at least as stringent as the standards 
applied with respect to the magistrate’s assessment” when confronted 
with a request for a warrant.28   
In the context of a search warrant, the Supreme Court ruled in Illinois 
v. Gates29 that the determination of probable cause involves a practical, 
common sense decision as to whether, in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular place.”30  In other words, “probable 
cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal 
activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”31
In the context of an arrest, with or without a warrant,32  probable cause 
has been found to be present when “the facts and circumstances” known 
to the law enforcement officer are “sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] 
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an 
offense.”33  Probable cause to arrest “does not require indubitable or 
necessarily convincing evidence,”34 or facts necessary to establish a 
conviction,35 or “a prima facie showing of criminal activity,”36 or “even 
evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect 
committed a crime.”37  What  is required is a “fair probability” that the 
 28. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971). 
 29. Gates, 462 U.S. at 213. 
 30. Id. at 238. 
 31. Id. at 244 n.13; accord United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 784 (8th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Goddard, 312 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 32. See United States v. Villegas, 700 F. Supp. 94, 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The 
probable cause necessary for a warrantless arrest is neither greater than nor lesser than 
that needed for a magistrate to issue a warrant . . . .”). 
 33. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (“The quantum of information which constitutes probable 
cause—evidence which would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that a 
felony has been committed—must be measured by the facts of the particular case.”) 
(citation omitted); accord United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gordon, 231 
F.3d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 34. Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 35. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Morris, 247 F.3d at 
1088; United States v. Reyes, 225 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gray, 137 
F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 n.9 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
 36. Tokar v. Bowersox, 198 F.3d 1039, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United 
States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) (“In order to establish probable cause, it is 
not necessary to make a ‘prima facie showing of criminal activity’ or to demonstrate that 
it is more probable than not that a crime has been or is being committed.”). 
 37. United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Piazza v. 
Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[P]robable cause ‘does not demand any 
showing that [the belief that an offense was committed] be correct or more likely true 
than false.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 
(1983)); United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause 
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suspect has committed, or is committing, a crime.38  That probability is 
measured in terms of “something more than a bare suspicion, but need 
not reach the fifty percent mark.”39
But probable cause to arrest or search can also arise outside the 
domestic criminal warrant context.  For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 3144,40 
the federal material witnesses statute, a warrant for the arrest of a 
material witness will issue if there has been a showing, by way of 
affidavit41 and based on probable cause, that the witness has material 
knowledge of a crime, and that his or her presence is unlikely to be 
requires more than bare suspicion but need not be based on evidence sufficient to support 
a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than false.”); 
United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Probable cause . . . does 
not require any showing that the officer’s suspicions prove to be correct or that they are 
more likely true than false.”). 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 39. United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); see United States v. 
Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[P]robable cause standard does not 
require the officers’ conclusion to be ironclad, or even highly probable.  Their 
conclusion that probable cause exists need only be reasonable.”); Samos Imex Corp. v. 
Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 194 F.3d 301, 303 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The phrase ‘probable cause’ 
is used, in the narrow confines of Fourth Amendment precedent, to establish a standard 
less demanding than ‘more probable than not.’”); Roberts v. Hochstetler, 592 F. Supp. 
703, 712 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (“[T]he proof for probable cause does not approach the level 
of proof needed for guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”); cf. Garcia, 179 F.3d at 269 (noting that probable cause to arrest does not 
mean that “a reasonable person would have thought, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that a defendant committed a crime.”). 
 40. Section 3144 provides: 
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is 
material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become 
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial 
officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance 
with the provisions of section 3142 [The Bail Reform Act] of this title.  No 
material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any 
condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured 
by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of 
justice.  Release of a material witness may be delayed for a reasonable period 
of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). 
 41. See United States v. Fuentes-Galindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(“Prior to commencing the procedure delineated in § 3144, a party must file an affidavit 
establishing that the circumstances contemplated in that section are present.”).  But see 
Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 66 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing how the Assistant 
United States Attorney obtained a material witness warrant “without the affidavit 
required by Section 3149”).  Section 3149 is the surety bond provision for section 3144.  
See § 3144; 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (2000). 




achieved by subpoena.42  This requirement is necessary because “the 
arrest and detention of a potential witness is just as much an invasion of 
the person’s security as if she had been arrested on a criminal charge.”43
An example of the application of the probable cause standard outside 
the domestic criminal warrant context with respect to a search is found 
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).44  Under FISA, a 
special court, composed of eleven federal district court judges 
designated by the Chief Justice,45 may issue a surveillance warrant if it 
finds, in addition to certain other requirements, that there is probable 
cause that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or 
an agent of a foreign power” and that the place or facility at which the 
surveillance will be “directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”46  With this discussion of 
probable cause to search and seize in place, we now turn to a brief 
examination of the nature of, and the procedures governing, the hearing 
governing a foreign request for extradition.47
 42. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n 
application for a material witness warrant under § 3144 must establish probable cause to 
believe that (1) the witness’s testimony is material, and (2) it may become impracticable 
to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena.”); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 
933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
 43. Perkins v. Click, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (D.N.M. 2001).  After arrest, a 
material witness may be released on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance 
bond, released subject to certain conditions, or detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(c), (e) 
(2000). 
 44. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).  As the court observed in 
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991): 
By enacting FISA, Congress sought to resolve doubts about the constitutionality of 
warrantless, foreign security surveillance and yet protect the interests of the 
United States in obtaining vital intelligence about foreign powers.  FISA thus 
created a “secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct 
legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within the 
context of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.” 
Id. at 461 (citation omitted). 
 45. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2004). 
 46. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000); see also United States v. Squillacote, 
221 F.3d 542, 553 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing requirements); United States v. Megahey, 
553 F. Supp. 1180, 1183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).  This articulation of probable cause in the 
national security context is not surprising.  Prior to the enactment of FISA, the Supreme 
Court recognized in United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972): 
Different standards [of probable cause] may be compatible with the Fourth 
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of 
Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our 
citizens.  For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental 
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. 
Id. at 322-23.   
 47. As noted earlier, in many cases, the detention is likely to be triggered by a 
request for a provisional arrest warrant.  See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
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III.  THE EXTRADITION HEARING 
While extradition proceedings are sui generis48 and are not considered 
criminal prosecutions,49 they are, to some degree, analogous to preliminary 
hearings.50  Thus, the governing standard at extradition hearings, established 
by federal law,51 is probable cause.52  At an extradition hearing, the 
 48. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 498 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(“[E]xtradition proceedings are sui generis . . . .”); In re Munguia, 294 F. Supp. 2d 893, 
895 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“[E]ach separate extradition treaty between the United States of 
America and a foreign nation is sui generis, and as a contract between two sovereigns, 
sets forth its own law.”). 
 49. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 181 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Extradition . . . is 
not a ‘criminal prosecution.’”); Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 603 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A]n 
extradition hearing is not a criminal prosecution: the order of extraditability expresses no 
judgment on [petitioner’s] guilt or innocence.”).  As the court observed in In re Garcia, 
188 F. Supp. 2d  921 (N.D. Ill. 2002), numerous constitutional protections applicable to 
criminal proceedings are not present when extradition is involved: 
For example, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Fifth 
Amendment right against undue delay are inapplicable to an extradition.  
Likewise, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel does not apply to 
extradition proceedings.  The Supreme Court has found no constitutional 
infirmity where those subject to extradition proceedings have been denied an 
opportunity to confront their accusers.  Finally, the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee against double jeopardy and the right to a Miranda warning are 
inapplicable to an extradition proceeding. 
Id. at 933 (citations omitted); see also Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828-30 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that there is a constitutional right under the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause to a “speedy extradition”).   
 50. See Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) (noting that an extradition 
proceeding is “of the character of those preliminary examinations which take place every 
day in this country before an examining or committing magistrate for the purpose of 
determining whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused”); 
David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[A]n extradition hearing 
is of the character of a preliminary hearing and is not to be converted into a full-dress 
trial.”) (citations omitted). 
 51. See Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he probable cause 
standard applicable in extradition proceedings is identical to that used by courts in 
federal preliminary hearings.”); Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 
1993) (“Before [petitioner] can be certified for extradition, a court must find probable 
cause under federal law that he committed the offense he is charged with by the [foreign] 
government.”); Castro Bobadilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (“In 
extradition proceedings, probable cause is measured by the federal standard used in 
preliminary proceedings.”).  But see In re Schweidenback, 3 F. Supp. 2d 113, 116 (D. 
Mass. 1998) (“[I]t is the state standard of probable cause that is the appropriate one to be 
applied.”).  
 52. See Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1962) (“With respect 
to the evidence upon which the extradition magistrate acted, it must be remembered that 
the extradition magistrate merely determines probable cause, making an inquiry like that 
of a committing magistrate and no more.”); accord Polo v. Horgan, 828 F. Supp. 961, 




probable cause standard is defined as “evidence sufficient to cause a 
person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a 
reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt,”53 or “the existence of a 
reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”54  In other words, the 
magistrate’s role at the extradition hearing is “to determine whether 
there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, 
and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a 
conviction.”55
The judicial officer presiding over the extradition hearing “has wide 
latitude in admitting evidence.”56  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence do not apply.57  A person whose extradition is sought has no 
right to cross-examine witnesses at an extradition hearing58 and there is 
no obligation on the part of the government to provide discovery or 
965 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (“To certify an extradition warrant, a magistrate need only find 
probable cause that ‘the evidence [is] sufficient to sustain the charge.’”); In re Ryan, 360 
F. Supp. 270, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (“The extraditing magistrate’s function is to 
determine whether there is any evidence sufficient to establish reasonable or probable 
cause to believe that the detainee committed the crimes charged.”). 
 53. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord In re 
Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 932; Sidali, 107 F.3d at 199. 
 54. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1980); accord 
Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir. 1931) (“[The magistrate must] determine 
whether upon the evidence adduced before him there is reasonable ground to believe that 
the crime charged has been committed . . . .”); In re Cervantes Valles, 268 F. Supp. 2d 
758, 772 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“Probable cause is the existence of reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused committed the offense charged.”).  
 55. Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Collins v. Loisel, 
259 U.S. 309, 316 (1922)); cf. In re Chan Seong-I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1161 (D.N.M. 
2004) (“The evidence showing probable cause need not be sufficient evidence to support 
a conviction, but need only be sufficient to warrant a finding that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the relator is guilty and thus hold her for trial.”); Ward v. Rutherford, 
921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[The extradition hearing is] essentially a 
‘preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made out which will justify the 
holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding nation.’”).    
 56. In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1219 (S.D. Cal. 1997); see also In re 
Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Admission of evidence in an 
international extradition proceeding is within the magistrate’s discretion.”). 
 57. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5) (“These rules are not applicable to extradition 
and rendition of fugitives . . . .”); FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (“The rules . . . do not 
apply . . . [to] [p]roceedings for extradition or rendition . . . .”); In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 
720-21 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he rules of evidence and civil procedure that govern federal 
court proceedings heard under the authority of Article III of the United States 
Constitution do not apply in extradition hearings that are conducted under the authority 
of a treaty enacted pursuant to Article II.”).   
 58. See Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984) (“As in the case 
of a grand jury proceeding, a defendant has no right to cross-examine witnesses or 
introduce evidence to rebut that of the prosecutor.”).  
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produce exculpatory evidence.59  Credibility determinations are the 
province of the extraditing judicial officer60 and the evidence at an 
extradition hearing may consist of hearsay.61  Furthermore, section 3190 
permits the demanding country to introduce properly authenticated 
evidence gathered at home62 and the defenses available to one sought to 
be extradited are limited.  For example, “evidence of alibi or of facts 
contradicting the demanding country’s proof or of a defense such as 
insanity may properly be excluded . . . .”63  Accomplice testimony,64 or a 
 59. See Montemayor Seguy v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (S.D. Tex. 
2004) (“The extradition law, the extradition treaty, and the United States Constitution do 
not require production of exculpatory evidence at an extradition hearing.”); Prasoprat v. 
Benov, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[A] fugitive in an extradition case 
has no right to discovery.”).  But see Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 353-54 (6th 
Cir. 1993) (recognizing that government must provide exculpatory evidence where it has 
conducted its own investigation of the offense underlying the extradition request and 
uncovered exculpatory information); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (“Although there is no explicit statutory basis for ordering discovery in 
extradition hearings, the extradition magistrate has the right, under the court’s ‘inherent 
power,’ to order such discovery procedures ‘as law and justice require.’”) (citations 
omitted).   
 60. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 815 (“The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 
accorded their testimony is solely within the province of the extradition magistrate.”). 
 61. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922) (“[U]nsworn statements of 
absent witnesses may be acted upon by the committing magistrate, although they could 
not have been received by him under the law of the State on a preliminary 
examination.”); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The 
evidence may consist . . . entirely of hearsay.”); In re Then, 92 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 
1996) (“[H]earsay evidence is admissible to support a probable cause determination in an 
extradition hearing . . . .”); Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635, 636 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“Hearsay evidence is admissible.”).   
 62. Section 3190, which is captioned “Evidence on hearing,” states: 
Depositions, warrants or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence 
upon the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as 
evidence on such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be 
properly and legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for 
similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the 
accused party shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic 
or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall 
be proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required. 
18 U.S.C. § 3190 (2000).    
 63. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Hooker v. 
Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting alibi or other evidence contradicting 
proof of probable cause inadmissible); United States v. Peterka, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 
1349 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (“[E]xtraditees may only introduce evidence to explain rather 
than contradict the evidence presented by the Government, and the court shall exclude 
evidence that is proffered to contradict testimony, challenge the credibility of witnesses, 
or establish a defense to the crimes alleged.”); In re Cervantes Valles, 268 F. Supp. 2d 
758, 772 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“[T]he accused has no right to present a defense to the 




certified copy of a foreign conviction upon which the extradition request 
is based, have been held sufficient to establish probable cause.65  Of 
course, the evidence presented must establish that the person sought to 
be extradited is the one who has been charged or convicted of the 
crime(s) alleged in the extradition request.66  Ultimately, a certificate of 
extradition will issue if the judicial officer had jurisdiction over the 
subject matter and the person sought to be extradited, the offense for 
which extradition was sought was an extraditable offense under a treaty 
in effect at the time of the request, and competent evidence is presented 
sufficient to establish probable cause that the extraditee committed the 
alleged offense.67
charges against him, such as an alibi defense, and has no right to introduce evidence 
which merely contradicts the demanding country’s proof, or which only poses conflicts 
of credibility.”); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“Evidence 
that conflicts with that submitted on behalf of the demanding party is not permitted, nor 
is impeachment of the credibility of the demanding country’s witnesses.”); Powers, 
supra note 13, at 312-13 (discussing the rule of noncontradiction). 
 64. See Bovio v. United States, 989 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Accomplice 
testimony can be used to find probable cause . . . .”); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1227 
(“[S]elf incriminating statements of accomplices are sufficient to establish probable 
cause in an extradition hearing.”); In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(“[T]he accomplice testimony evidence, which is, under the rules governing extradition 
proceedings, deemed credible even without corroboration, sufficiently demonstrates that 
probable cause exists to support the certification of [petitioner] for extradition.”).  For 
cases discussing how the recantation of accomplice testimony may affect the probable 
cause analysis, see Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 510-12 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Atuar, 
300 F. Supp. 2d 418, 427-31, 434-35 (S.D. W.Va. 2003); In re Strunk, 293 F. Supp. 2d 
1117, 1125-26 (E.D. Cal. 2003); United States v. Linson, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (D. 
Guam 2000); In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1221-26; In re Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914, 
923-24 (S.D. Cal. 1994); In re Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1464-69 (S.D. Tex. 1992); 
Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1044-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Republic of Fr. v. 
Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 782-84 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
 65. See Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] certified 
copy of a foreign conviction, obtained following a trial at which the defendant was 
present, is sufficient to sustain a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause 
exists to extradite.”).   
 66. See Noel v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 1998) 
(identification based on birthday, nationality, and appearance in photograph); cf. In re De 
Jesus Alatorre Pliego, 320 F. Supp. 2d 947, 950-51 (D. Ariz. 2004) (“[T]here is no 
probable cause to believe that the [person] who was arrested and sitting in the courtroom 
at the extradition hearing is the person that was identified by the witnesses as committing 
the fraud.”); In re Cervantes Valles, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (“This is a textbook case of 
mistaken identity, and the governments of the U.S. and Mexico, in the interests of 
justice, ought to have conceded that fact.”).   
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); see In re Atuar, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26 
(identifying factors); In re Fulgencio Garcia, 188 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2002); 
In re Mainero, 990 F. Supp. at 1216.  See generally Powers, supra note 13, at 290 
(discussing factors). 
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IV.  PROVISIONAL ARREST 
The first American treaties allowing for provisional arrest were 
entered into with the Netherlands and Russia in 1887.68  This practice 
continued and modern extradition treaties generally allow the provisional 
arrest of the person sought to be extradited if urgent circumstances are 
present.69  Urgent circumstances “may include the fact that the fugitive 
is a flight risk, is in country for only a short period of time, or is deemed 
to be a danger to society.”70  Section 3184 provides for the issuance of a 
warrant “upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found 
within [the magistrate or judge’s] jurisdiction, with having committed 
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes 
provided for by . . . treaty or convention . . . .”71  But must the judge or 
magistrate also make an independent determination that there is probable 
cause for the arrest of the fugitive under the standard applicable to 
domestic criminal warrants?  If so, what type of evidence is sufficient?  
Or, should probable cause in the context of provisional arrest warrants 
be measured not against the fair probability that a fugitive has 
committed a criminal offense, but rather, by facts demonstrating the 
existence of a treaty and an arrest warrant for such fugitive by the 
requesting country based on an offense found under the treaty?  We 
begin our discussion with Supreme Court cases which analyzed the 
sufficiency of the complaint to support a warrant under section 3184’s 
predecessor.  We then turn to the more recent cases which explicitly or 
implicitly have addressed the Fourth Amendment question. 
 68. See Reuschlein, supra note 5, at 44-45.  “Well before the beginning of the final 
decade of the nineteenth century, articles providing for provisional arrest had very 
definitely come into general acceptance and in virtually all treaties negotiated between 
the several nations these articles are to be found.”  Id. at 46.   
 69. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-15.230 (“Every extradition 
treaty to which the United States is a party requires a formal request for extradition, 
supported by appropriate documents.  Because the time involved in preparing a formal 
request can be lengthy, most treaties allow for the provisional arrest of fugitives in 
urgent cases.”); Kester, supra note 13, at 1464 (“Most extradition treaties contain a 
clause permitting the ‘provisional arrest’ of the person sought, for a limited time pending 
completion of a formal extradition request, if there is urgency, usually because of a 
danger or likelihood of imminent flight.”).  If the extradition request is made at the same 
time or before the arrest warrant is sought, the warrant is not deemed provisional.  See 
Wiehl, supra note 10, at 733 n.7. 
 70. 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1631.1-1(a) (2005), 
available at http://foia.state.gov/Regs/fams.asp?level=2&id=8&fam=0.  
 71. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000).  




A.  Early Cases 
Between 1901 and 1925, the Supreme Court decided five cases 
addressing the sufficiency of an extradition complaint under section 
5270 of the Revised Statutes, the predecessor to section 3184.72  The 
first of these cases was Rice v. Ames,73 where the Court ruled that an 
officer of a foreign government could present a “complaint upon 
information and belief, stating the sources of his information and the 
grounds of his belief, and annexing to the complaint a properly certified 
copy of any indictment or equivalent proceeding . . . or a copy of the 
depositions of witnesses having actual knowledge of the facts . . . .”74  
One year later, in Grin v. Shine,75 the Court observed that a complaint 
under oath could “be made by any person acting under the authority of 
the foreign government having knowledge of the facts, or, in the absence 
 72. The original law was passed in 1848.  See Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 
Stat. 302.  In 1878, section 1 of this act became section 5270 of the Revised Statutes.  
See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 731 n.2.  Section 5270 provided: 
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the 
Government of the United States and any foreign government, any justice of 
the Supreme Court, circuit judge, district judge, commissioner, authorized so 
to do by any of the courts of the United States, or judge of a court of record of 
general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, 
charging any person found within the limits of any State, district, or Territory, 
with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government 
any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant 
for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before 
such justice, judge, or commissioner, to the end that the evidence of criminality 
may he heard and considered.  If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence 
sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or 
convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony 
taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the 
requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the 
surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or 
convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so 
charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made. 
In 1940, section 5270 became codified at 18 U.S.C. § 651 and in 1948, it became 18 
U.S.C. § 3184.  See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 731 n.2.  In 1968, the Federal Magistrate 
Acts changed the term “commissioner” to “magistrate” in section 3184.  See Federal 
Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 301(a)(3), 82 Stat. 1115 (1968).  One 
commentator has noted that “[a]lthough the language has been corrected, modernized, 
and slightly amended, the 1848 statute continues to govern extradition proceedings 
today.”  Parry, supra note 13, 134-35; see Powers, supra note 13, at 282 (“Although the 
statute has been amended . . . it remains substantially similar to the one enacted over a 
century and a half ago.”).   
 73. 180 U.S. 371 (1901). 
 74. Id. at 375-76.  
 75. 187 U.S. 181 (1902).  
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of such person, by the official representative of the foreign government 
based upon depositions in his possession . . . .”76
Several years later, in Yordi v. Nolte,77 the Court again confronted the 
sufficiency of an extradition complaint.  In Yordi, Mexico’s consul 
presented a complaint for petitioner’s arrest for fraud and forgery of 
documents.78  The complaint was based on information and belief.79  At 
the time the consul made the complaint, however, he had before him the 
record of the proceedings in Mexico relating to the offense and the 
depositions of witnesses.80  Rejecting the contention that the complaint 
was deficient because it had no evidentiary attachments, the Court held 
that the record from Mexico had been before the commissioner when the 
warrant was issued and such record “corrected any irregularity in the 
complaint.”81
 76. Id. at 193.  Some commentators have noted that Grin could be interpreted as a 
retreat from Rice with respect to the sufficiency of the extradition complaint.  See 
Angelo M. Russo, Note, The Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong Turn 
in Light of the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the Requirement 
of Probable Cause for a Provisional Arrest in Parretti v. United States, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1041, 1056 (2000) (“The significant difference between the Grin and Rice opinions 
was the requirement of supplemental evidence.  The Court in Grin did not specify 
whether the depositions were to be sent directly to the judge or if it was sufficient for the 
representative to inform the judge of their presence.”); Wiehl, supra note 10, at 747 
(“The Grin Court did not indicate whether the issuing U.S. magistrate ought to see 
copies of these depositions before issuing a warrant, or whether it was sufficient that the 
magistrate merely be assured that the foreign authorities had such depositions in their 
possession before they made their complaint.”). 
 77. 215 U.S. 227 (1909). 
 78. Id. at 228. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 232.  “This record from Mexico was not only before the Mexican consul 
when he made the complaint against Yordi, now under consideration, but the commissioner 
was thoroughly familiar with it, as it had been introduced in evidence before him upon 
the hearing of the first complaint.”  Id. at 229-30.  In Yordi, the Court observed: 
The complaint may, in some instances, be upon information and belief.  The 
exigencies may be such that the criminal may escape punishment unless he is 
promptly apprehended by the representatives of the country whose law he has 
violated.  From the very nature of the case it may often happen that such 
representative can have no personal knowledge of the crime.  If the offense be 
one of the treaty crimes, and if it be stated clearly and explicitly so that the 
accused knows exactly what the charge is, the complaint is sufficient to 
authorize the commissioner to act.   
Id. at 230-31 (quoting Ex parte Sternaman, 77 F. 595, 597 (N.D.N.Y. 1896)).  However, 
in light of Yordi’s recognition that the record from Mexico was before the magistrate at 
the time of the issuance of the warrant, it has been suggested that “the case can be read 
for the proposition that an arrest warrant application in an extradition case should be 




The last two cases touching on the sufficiency of extradition complaints 
during this period are Glucksman v. Henkel82 and Fernandez v. 
Phillips.83  In Glucksman, the Court, citing Rice, ruled that while the 
complaint was on information and belief, it was “supported by the 
testimony of witnesses who [were] stated to have [been] deposed,” and 
therefore, presumably sworn.84  In Fernandez, the complaint was based 
on information obtained through diplomatic channels that petitioner had 
been charged with embezzlement of public funds in Mexico.85  In 
rejecting the contention that the complaint had been defective, the Court 
noted that appended to it was a copy of the proceedings in the Mexican 
court establishing the commission of the crime and ordering his arrest.86  
This evidence, according to the Court, was present at the extradition 
hearing.87
When testing the sufficiency of the complaint in Rice, Grin, Yordi, 
Glucksman, and Fernandez, the Court did not mention, much less rely 
upon, the Fourth Amendment.  The focus of these cases, none of which 
appear to have involved provisional arrest warrants, was whether the 
complaint could be based on information and belief, and if it was, the 
evidentiary support necessary to render the complaint legally sufficient.88  
Whether the complaint needed to establish anything more than the fact 
based upon some form of attached deposition or documentary evidence and not merely a 
government lawyer’s allegations on information and belief.”  Wiehl, supra note 10, at 
747. 
 82. 221 U.S. 508 (1911). 
 83. 268 U.S. 311 (1925). 
 84. Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 514. 
 85. Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 313. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes stated: 
Of course, whatever form of words was used, the complaint necessarily was 
upon information, but as appeared at the hearing it was filed by order of the 
Attorney General, upon request of the Secretary of State, enclosing a request 
for the extradition from the Mexican Government and a copy of proceedings in 
a Mexican Court finding that the crime was duly proved against the appellant 
and ordering his arrest, many pages of evidence being appended. 
Id.; see Wiehl, supra note 10, at 748 (“[T]he Court noted with approval that by the time 
of the extradition hearing, many pages of evidence had been appended to the 
complaint.”).  Relying on Fernandez, the court in United States ex rel. Petrushansky v. 
Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1963), ruled that an extradition complaint filed by an 
Assistant United States Attorney without personal knowledge was legally valid.  Id. at 
564.  Furthermore, while the complaint failed to specify the details of the crime (a 
murder) with which petitioner had been charged in Mexico, under the treaty, “each 
government [was] obligated, upon being notified by the other that it [had] issued a 
warrant of arrest, to procure the provisional arrest of fugitives and to detain them until 
supporting papers [were] received.”  Id.  That understanding, the court determined, appeared 
to contemplate the issuance of provisional arrest warrants under the circumstances 
presented in Marasco.  Id. 
 88. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 744-48 (discussing cases).  
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that the fugitive had been charged with an extraditable offense is not 
clear from these opinions.  The more recent cases, when analyzing 
requests for provisional arrest warrants, have sought to shed light on this 
question. 
B.  Recent Cases 
The first case in the last thirty years to question implicitly the 
constitutionality of a provisional arrest warrant based on a telephonic 
communication that the fugitive had been charged with an extraditable 
crime is United States v. Williams.89  In Williams, defendant was arrested 
on the basis of a telephonic communication from Canadian authorities 
that he had been charged with violations of Canadian criminal law.90  
The treaty between the United States and Canada provided for the 
provisional arrest of a person based on an application that contained a 
description of the person sought, the warrant for arrest which had been 
issued by the requesting country, “and such further information, if any, 
as would be necessary to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had the 
offense been committed . . . in the territory of the requested State.”91  In 
Williams, there was no indication in the opinion that the warrant was 
issued on anything other than the existence of the Canadian warrant.92
While the principal focus in Williams was whether defendant was 
entitled to be released on bail pending his extradition hearing, the court 
also expressed concern about how defendant came to be detained in the 
first place.  Specifically, the court noted that sustaining the government’s 
position of no bail pending the hearing would deprive the defendant “of 
his liberty for 30 days or more, without any showing and determination 
of reasonable grounds for commitment, and without an opportunity to 
show that his attendance at that hearing [could] be reasonably assured by 
bail.”93  Although subsequently reversed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, the district court granted Williams bail, 
rejecting the government’s contention that the interest in fulfilling treaty 
 89. 480 F. Supp. 482 (D. Mass. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 611 F.2d 914 (1st 
Cir. 1979).  
 90. Id. at 483.  In its opinion, the district court referred to Williams as “defendant” 
and the discussion above adopts that reference. 
 91. Id. at 485 n.1 (quoting Treaty of Extradition Between the United States and 
Canada, art. 11, Dec. 3, 1971, 991 T.I.A.S. No. 8237).  
 92. See id. at 483.  
 93. Id. at 485.  




obligations overrode the “intrusion on personal liberty” presented by his 
detention.94
In United States v. Wiebe,95 petitioner, a Canadian national, was arrested 
in the United States following the execution of a provisional arrest 
warrant.96  The basis for the provisional arrest warrant was a Spanish 
warrant which had been issued in connection with the murder of two 
Colombian nationals in Barcelona, Spain.97  Following an extradition hearing, 
at which petitioner testified, the magistrate concluded that there was 
probable cause that he had committed the murders in Spain and ordered 
him extraditable.98  Petitioner thereafter contested this finding in a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus which the district court denied.99
On appeal, petitioner argued that his arrest was unlawful because it 
was not supported by probable cause.100  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this contention.  Citing section 
3184, the court ruled that a magistrate could “issue a provisional arrest 
warrant upon a showing in a sworn complaint of a treaty of extradition 
between the United States and any foreign country, and that the person 
sought committed in the foreign jurisdiction one of the crimes set forth 
in the treaty.”101  In Wiebe, the complaint alleged that petitioner was sought 
for murder and that murder was an extraditable offense, therefore, the 
magistrate had not erred in issuing the warrant.102
A different result was reached by the court in Caltagirone v. Grant.103  
In Caltagirone, under the terms of its extradition treaty with the United 
States, Italy applied for the “provisional arrest” of one of its nationals 
pending a formal request for his extradition.104  The sworn complaint 
prepared by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York simply alleged that Italian warrants charging fraudulent bankruptcy 
and embezzlement had been issued for petitioner’s arrest.105  On the day 
of his arrest, petitioner moved to quash the warrant on the grounds that it 
 94. Id. at 485-88. 
 95. 733 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1984).  
 96. Id. at 550. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 552.  
 99. Id.  The district court had also denied an earlier petition in which Wiebe 
challenged his detention on the grounds that extradition documents had not been 
delivered in a timely fashion under the governing treaty.  Id. 
 100. Id. at 553.  Petitioner also raised other contentions relating to the determination 
at the hearing that there was probable cause that he had committed the crimes for which 
his extradition was sought and the formal transmission of extradition documents under 
the treaty, both of which the court rejected.  Id. at 552-54.   
 101. Id. at 553-54.  
 102. Id. at 554.   
 103. 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).   
 104. Id. at 743.  
 105. Id. 
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had been issued without a probable cause determination and the district 
court denied the motion.106  Petitioner thereafter renewed his motion and 
also sought a writ of habeas corpus, both of which were denied.107  On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed.108
The court began its analysis by noting that Article XIII of the 
extradition treaty with Italy contained four requirements in connection 
with the application for a provisional arrest warrant: a description of the 
person sought; an indication that a request for extradition would be 
forthcoming; the existence of an arrest warrant in the state seeking 
extradition; and “such further information, if any, as would be necessary 
to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been 
committed . . . in the territory of the requested Party.”109  Had the offense for 
which Italy sought extradition—fraudulent bankruptcy—been committed in 
the United States, probable cause would have been required before the 
issuance of an arrest warrant for one alleged to have committed that 
offense.110  Accordingly, since the warrant for petitioner’s provisional 
arrest was based solely on the existence of an Italian arrest warrant, it 
did not conform with the treaty’s requirements.111
With respect to the government’s contention that the probable cause 
determination was reserved under Article XI of the treaty to the 
extradition hearing pursuant to a formal request for extradition, and not 
to the decision involving the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant,112 
the court ruled that while these proceedings “differ[ed] in some way, the 
difference [did] not lie in the requirement of probable cause.”113  In 
 106. Id.   
 107. Id.   
 108. Id. at 750.   
 109. Id. at 744 (internal quotation omitted).   
 110. Id.   
 111. Id. at 744-47.   
 112. While Article XI of the treaty did not expressly provide for the presentation of 
evidence before a judge or magistrate establishing probable cause, the court reasoned 
that it was “presumably because 18 U.S.C. § 3184 already require[d] such a proceeding 
in all formal requests for extradition.”  Id. at 745. 
 113. Id. at 747.  The court explained: 
Article XI and Article XIII both require a showing of probable cause, but the 
proceedings they contemplate are different in several crucial respects.  Article 
XIII requires “information,” and lists no formalities attending its provision by 
the applying state. . . .  Article XI, on the other hand, requires “evidence,” a 
word which necessarily implies a greater degree of formality in procedures 
than “information.”  Unlike Article XIII, Article XI requires both certified 




short, by interpreting the “further information” language in the treaty to 
incorporate a requirement of probable cause, in addition to the existence 
of an arrest warrant from the requesting state, the court in Caltagirone 
was able to avoid the question of whether, in the context of a provisional 
arrest warrant, absent such a clause, the Fourth Amendment required an 
independent showing of probable cause.114
In In re Russell,115 Colombia sought a provisional arrest warrant for 
petitioner in connection with a fraudulent transaction in which thirteen  
million dollars was transferred from a Colombian government account at 
the Chase Manhattan Bank in London.116  After the magistrate issued the 
warrant and petitioner was arrested, he sought relief through a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus which the district court denied.117
On appeal, petitioner argued that the provisional arrest clause under the 
treaty between the United States and Colombia was unconstitutional 
because it provided for the arrest of American citizens without a 
determination of probable cause.118  Additionally, petitioner maintained 
that his arrest and detention were not supported by probable cause and 
therefore violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.119  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these contentions. 
The Fifth Circuit initially noted that the court in Caltagirone had 
construed the treaty at issue there as requiring probable cause in connection 
depositions establishing probable cause and a copy of the actual warrant of 
arrest issued by the magistrate in the requesting state. . . .  Moreover, under 
Article XI the requesting states must “prov[e],” not allege, that the relator is 
the person named in the warrants, and must provide an extensive documentary 
appendix to its request setting forth, inter alia, its law defining the offense, 
prescribing the punishment, and setting the time period in which charges may 
be brought. 
Id.  
 114. Id.  In United States ex rel. Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 
1963), the court held that a warrant for a “provisional arrest” could be issued on the basis 
of a complaint that Marasco had been charged with murder in Mexico.  Id. at 564.  The 
court in Caltagirone distinguished Marasco on the grounds that the Fourth Amendment 
issue had not been raised and also that “evidence establishing probable cause was 
produced.”  Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 748 n.19. 
 115. 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).   
 116. Id. at 1216. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1217.  That clause read in part: 
In case of urgency either Contracting Party may request, through the 
diplomatic channel, the provisional detention of an accused or convicted 
person.  The application shall contain a description of the person sought, a 
statement of intention to present the request for extradition of the person 
sought . . . and a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgment 
of conviction against that person. 
Treaty of Extradition Between the United States of America and Colombia, U.S.-Colom., 
art. 11(1), Sept. 14, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-8 (1981). 
 119. Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217. 
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with the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant.120  Assuming, without 
deciding, that the extradition treaty with Colombia also required a 
showing of probable cause, the court in Russell found that the evidence 
presented to the magistrate had met that standard.121  This evidence had 
consisted of the sworn complaint describing the transaction, letters from 
petitioner to the Consul General of Colombia about it (and the Consul’s 
response), and petitioner’s testimony.122
In Sahagian v. United States,123 an American citizen who had been 
detained in Spain under an extradition treaty, returned to the United 
States, and then released after the original charges were dropped, 
brought suit against a number of federal officials alleging that his arrest 
and detention had violated his constitutional rights.124  The treaty 
between the United States and Spain contained a “further information” 
clause in connection with a request for a provisional arrest similar to that 
in Caltagirone.125  In rejecting Sahagian’s contention that his arrest was 
unlawful because he had not first been indicted, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed in a footnote that there was 
some tension between Russell and Caltagirone over the probable cause 
showing in the context of provisional arrest warrants.126  In the case 
before it, however, since Sahagian’s arrest was supported by probable 
cause,127 the court did not need to “venture into this debate or decide 
 120. Id.   
 121. Id.   
 122. Id. at 1217-18.  In Russell, the magistrate issued a warrant for petitioner’s 
arrest based on the complaint filed by the U.S. Attorney alleging that petitioner was a 
fugitive from justice and that he had been charged under a warrant with violations of the 
Colombian Penal Code.  In re Russell, 647 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 1986), aff’d, 
805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).  The complaint enumerated the details of the acts charged 
in the warrant and also included petitioner’s description and address.  Id. at 1050-51.  One 
week after petitioner’s arrest, the magistrate held a hearing at which he took evidence 
and ruled that there was probable cause for petitioner’s continued detention.  Id. at 1045, 
1050-51.   
 123. 864 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1988).   
 124. Id. at 510-12.   
 125. Id. at 511 (“An application for a provisional arrest is required to contain a 
description of the person sought, an indication of intent to extradite, a statement of the 
existence of an arrest warrant, and such ‘further information, if any, as may be required 
by the requested Party.’”).   
 126. Id. at 513 n.4.   
 127. The court ruled that the treaty did not deprive petitioner of any constitutional 
rights since federal officials had secured his “provisional arrest and detention pending 
extradition after obtaining an arrest warrant from a magistrate based upon a showing of 
probable cause.”  Id. at 513.   




whether the debate even [had] any applicability when the United States 
[sought] the provisional arrest and detention of a person.”128
The most recent circuit court opinion addressing the application of the 
probable cause standard to a provisional arrest warrant is Parretti v. 
United States.129  Although that opinion was subsequently withdrawn by 
the Ninth Circuit when, sitting en banc, it determined that the appeal 
should be dismissed because of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine,130 
the court’s analysis and treatment of the issue may influence or guide 
judges or magistrates in the future, and thus, merits discussion here.131
In Parretti, petitioner, an Italian citizen, was arrested pursuant to a 
provisional arrest warrant under the extradition treaty between the United 
States and France.132  The warrant was based on the complaint of an Assistant 
United States Attorney acting on behalf of the Government of France.133  
The complaint alleged that petitioner had been charged in an arrest 
warrant issued in France with various business related crimes, that the 
crimes were extraditable offenses under the treaty, and that France had 
requested petitioner’s provisional arrest.134  Neither the French warrant, 
affidavits, nor any “other competent evidence” were attached to the 
complaint.135
Following his arrest, petitioner argued at his bail hearing and on his 
habeas petition to the district court that the provisional warrant violated 
the Fourth Amendment on two grounds.  First, it was not based on any 
 128. Id. at 513 n.4; see United States v. Malcolm, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at 
*6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1999) (finding there was no need to decide whether probable cause 
was required for a provisional arrest because the recitation of facts in the complaint 
established it).  Sahagian, of course, did not involve section 3184 since the arrest took 
place in Spain.  Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 510-11. 
 129. 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  An earlier version of the Parretti 
opinion is found at 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997).  Given the en banc court’s ruling, 
the panel decision has no precedential value.  See In re Kyung Joon Kim, No. CV 
04-3886-ABC (PLA), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12444, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2004) 
(recognizing that the earlier Parretti opinion “is not the law in [the Ninth] Circuit”). 
 130. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 509.  Developed in the late nineteenth century in the 
context of criminal appeals, see United States v. $40,877.59 in United States Currency, 
32 F.3d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994), the fugitive disentitlement establishes that a 
“fugitive from justice may not seek relief from the judicial system whose authority he or 
she evades.”  Martha B. Stolley, Note, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive 
Disentitlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 752 (1997).  Equitable in 
nature, see In re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1995), the doctrine has been applied 
in criminal and civil cases, at both the trial and appellate levels.  See Pesin v. Rodriguez, 
244 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001).   
 131. See Olson, supra note 7, at 167-68 (“Despite the withdrawal, the detrimental 
impact of the panel’s decision on the future of international extradition is certain because 
of the important constitutional questions it raises.”).   
 132. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.   
 135. Id.   
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evidence that he had committed any of the offenses with which he had 
been charged in the French warrant.136  Second, the magistrate judge had 
failed to make a probable cause determination.137  The district court 
denied the petition and, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the government had failed to 
make the necessary evidentiary showing of probable cause to believe 
that petitioner had committed an extraditable crime.138
The government initially argued that the rule of judicial non-inquiry139 
prohibited the court from looking behind the foreign warrant.140  The 
court rejected this contention finding that it represented an “unprecedented 
extension of the rule of judicial non-inquiry to a justiciable case or 
controversy.”141  The court then determined that in contrast to the treaties at 
issue in Caltagirone and Sahagian, the treaty with France could not 
“fairly be interpreted as requiring a showing of probable cause in addition to 
the existence of a foreign arrest warrant.”142  Similarly, the court found 
that section 3184 could not fairly be read as requiring a showing of 
probable cause in connection with a provisional arrest warrant.143  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 762.   
 138. Id. at 763.  The court also ruled that petitioner’s detention without bail violated 
his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 763-64.  
 139. The rule of non-inquiry provides that “[a]n extraditing court will generally not 
inquire into the procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the 
requesting country.”  Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th 
Cir. 1983); accord In re Chan Seong-I, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1157 (D.N.M. 2004).  The 
rationale for the rule is that such issues “properly fall[] within the exclusive purview of 
the executive branch.”  Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980)); accord Mainero v. Gregg, 
164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally Jacques Semmelman, Federal 
Courts, The Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition 
Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991) (arguing for strict application of the rule 
of non-inquiry in international extradition proceedings).   
 140. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 764-67.   
 141. Id. at 765 (“In this case, the government invites us to extend the rule of judicial 
non-inquiry to the paradigmatic justiciable question whether an arrest warrant has been 
issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  We respectfully decline the government’s 
invitation.”).   
 142. Id. at 769.   
 143. See id. at 770.  The court in Parretti observed: 
Section 3184 allows an arrest warrant to issue on the basis of a “complaint . . . 
charging [the person to be arrested] with having committed” an extraditable 
offense.  Once again, all § 3184 requires is a showing that the fugitive has been 
charged with committing an extraditable crime.  Section 3184 does not require 
an independent judicial determination of probable cause to believe the fugitive 
committed the offense.  Under § 3184, the purpose of the arrest is to allow the 




Lastly, unlike Russell, the court determined it could not avoid the Fourth 
Amendment question presented by finding, on the basis of the record, 
that petitioner’s arrest was supported by probable cause.144
Confronted with the constitutional question that Caltagirone, Russell, 
and Sahagian had “managed to avoid,” the court in Parretti held that the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause could not “be interpreted as allowing a 
lesser standard for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing treaty 
obligations than for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing our own 
domestic laws.”145  It concluded that the court in Wiebe had gone “astray” 
when it upheld the issuance of the warrant there based on a complaint 
that alleged petitioner had been charged with an extraditable crime.146  
Having determined that the treaty with France and section 3184 violated 
the Fourth Amendment, to the extent they permitted the issuance of 
provisional arrest warrants without an independent judicial determination of 
probable cause, the court then turned to the evidence which had been 
presented.147  That evidence, the panel concluded, was insufficient to 
establish probable cause because it consisted of facts alleged in the 
French warrant which were not supported by “affidavits, deposition 
testimony, or other competent evidence.”148
fugitive to be brought before a magistrate so that the “evidence of criminality 
may [then] be heard and considered.”  In other words, § 3184 contemplates an 
arrest so that thereafter, at the extradition hearing, the “evidence of criminality,” 
i.e., the existence of probable cause, may be heard. 
Id.    
 144. See id. at 770.   
 145. Id. at 771.   
 146. Id. at 772.  The court also found United States ex rel. Petrushansky v. 
Marasco, 325 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1963), unpersuasive because that case had not addressed 
the constitutional question.  Parretti, 122 F.3d at 771-72.   
 147. See id. at 773.  
 148. Id. at 774 (“In applying for the warrant to arrest Parretti, all the government 
presented were the French magistrate’s allegations of fact.”); id. at 775 (“[The 
allegations] may have been relayed to the State Department by a reliable source, but 
those allegations without supporting affidavits or other competent evidence provide no 
basis for a judicial determination whether there is probable cause to believe Parretti 
committed an extraditable crime.”).  The court recognized that in Yordi v. Nolte, 215 
U.S. 227 (1909), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a complaint in an 
extradition proceeding must be sworn to by persons having personal knowledge of the 
crime alleged.  Yordi, 215 U.S. at 230-31.  There, however, the magistrate had before 
him evidence consisting of the record and evidence in the foreign proceedings, which 
included the depositions of witnesses.  Id. at 228-29. 
In In re Orellana, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10380, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2000), 
citing Parretti, the court determined that the provisional arrest warrant had been issued 
in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because “neither the source of the 
information nor the grounds for the [prosecutor’s] belief [were] provided in the 
complaint.”  
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C.  Discussion 
It is well settled that at an extradition hearing under section 3184, the 
controlling standard is probable cause.149  This is so even though section 
3184 only refers to “evidence of criminality.”150  Furthermore, in 
applying this standard to extradition hearings, neither the Supreme Court 
nor any lower federal court has relied on the Fourth Amendment.151  But 
what about a warrant for the provisional arrest of a fugitive so that his 
appearance can be secured at the hearing?  Must that warrant be based 
on probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, and if so, probable 
cause of what? 
As demonstrated by the discussion above, while the early Supreme 
Court cases provided guidance relating to the legal sufficiency of 
extradition complaints,152 it is only recently that courts have confronted 
the question of whether a provisional arrest warrant needs to be 
supported by probable cause in the traditional Fourth Amendment 
sense.153  In that regard, the cases reveal that when the treaty allowing 
for a provisional arrest contained a “further information” clause,154 or 
when the record established probable cause to issue the warrant,155 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 51-52, 54. 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000) (stating that judges review extradition warrants “to 
the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered”); cf. Olson, supra 
note 7, at 176 (“[T]he statute lacks an explicit requirement that the government make a 
showing of probable cause for . . . extradition.”). 
 151. See Spatola v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 362, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he 
requirement that there be probable cause in order to extradite ‘has not yet been 
interpreted as emanating from the Fourth Amendment.’”); Olson, supra note 7, at 176 
(“Despite the absence of an explicit requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court has inferred 
from the statutory language a requirement of showing probable cause for extradition 
purposes, although no court has held the basis to be the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 152. See Powers, supra note 13, at 302 (“Early Supreme Court cases, while 
confusing, seemed to support the proposition that complaints could be based only on 
information and ‘belief.’”); Wiehl, supra note 10, at 745 (“While the Court offered 
language which appeared to favor a requirement that warrants be based on attached 
depositions or other documentary evidence, it also offered conflicting language 
suggesting that warrants could issue merely on ‘information and belief.’”).   
 153. See supra Part IV.B. 
 154. See Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1980) (“In our view, the 
language of Article XIII so clearly demands a showing of probable cause before any 
warrant for provisional arrest may issue, that we need not reach the constitutional 
question.”). 
 155. See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“Because there was a showing of probable cause to support [petitioner’s] arrest and 
detention, we need not venture into this debate . . . .”). 




whether or not the treaty contained such a clause,156  courts declined to 
decide whether, under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause needed to 
be shown for a provisional arrest warrant to issue.157  In Parretti, where 
those considerations were not present, the Ninth Circuit ruled, in a 
decision which was later withdrawn, that the Fourth Amendment did not 
“allow[] a lesser standard for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing 
treaty obligations than for arrests made for the purpose of enforcing our 
own domestic laws.”158
Implicit or explicit in those recent opinions was an application of the 
probable cause standard in the traditional domestic criminal sense, that 
is, probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that 
the petitioner committed it.159  One circuit court opinion from that period, 
however, can be interpreted to have applied the probable cause standard, 
but in a different context.  In Wiebe,160 relying on section 3184, the 
Eighth Circuit ruled that a magistrate could issue a provisional arrest 
warrant upon a showing in a sworn complaint that a person sought to be 
extradited had been charged with an extraditable offense.161  The complaint 
there simply had alleged that petitioner was sought for murder and that 
murder was an extraditable offense.162  This formulation of probable 
cause, which looks to the existence of a treaty and the assertion that the 
 156. See In re Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Assuming without 
deciding that the Treaty requires a showing of probable cause to support a provisional 
arrest before an extradition hearing, we agree with the district court that the magistrate 
had enough evidence before him to show probable cause to detain [the petitioner].”); 
United States v. Malcolm, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1999) 
(finding there was no need to decide whether probable cause was required for a 
provisional arrest because the recitation of facts in the complaint established it). 
 157.  Wiehl, supra note 10, at 758 (“In the past ten years, several appellate panels of 
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have 
questioned the constitutionality of allowing a provisional arrest warrant to issue without 
a prior evidentiary showing of probable cause but have managed to avoid deciding the 
constitutional issue.”); See Russo, supra note 76, at 1083 (“Most courts have avoided the 
question by interpreting the language of the corresponding extradition treaty as requiring 
probable cause.”). 
 158. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 771 (9th Cir. 1997), appeal denied, 
rev’d en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998).  The complaint in Parretti alleged that 
petitioner had been charged in an arrest warrant issued in France with various business 
related crimes, that the crimes were extraditable offenses under the treaty, and that 
France had requested petitioner’s provisional arrest.  Id. at 761.   
 159. See id. at 776; Sahagian, 864 F.2d at 513; Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217-18; 
Caltagirone, 629 F.2d at 744-45.   
 160. 733 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1984).  
 161. Id. at 553-54.  The court in Parretti observed that while the Wiebe court 
correctly cited the applicable standard, it “then went astray and inexplicably upheld a 
warrant even though it was based on a complaint that alleged only that Wiebe was 
charged with an extraditable crime.”  Parretti, 122 F.3d at 772.   
 162. Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 554. 
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fugitive has been charged with or has committed an extraditable offense, 
is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.163
As noted earlier, probable cause to arrest or search can arise outside 
the domestic criminal warrant context.164  In other words, a “warrant 
application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced 
and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.”165  Illustrative of 
this principle are material witness and FISA warrants.166  In terms of the 
present discussion, the former provides a useful analogy.167
Under the federal material witness statute,168 a warrant for the arrest of 
a material witness may issue if there has been a showing, by way of 
affidavit and based on probable cause, that the witness has material 
knowledge of a crime, and that his or her presence is unlikely to be 
achieved by subpoena.169  In a similar vein, section 3184 permits the 
issuance of a warrant “upon complaint made under oath, charging any 
person found within [the magistrate or judge’s] jurisdiction, with having 
committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of 
the crimes provided for by . . . treaty or convention.”170  As with material 
witness warrants, and supported by the court’s ruling in Wiebe, a 
determination of probable cause in the provisional arrest context should 
not be measured in the traditional domestic criminal warrant sense 
because the purpose of the seizure is not the initiation of a criminal 
prosecution, but rather, a determination of whether the fugitive should be 
 163. See In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D. Tex. 1957) (“Under Section 3184 
of Title 18, a judge or commissioner may issue a warrant . . . if (1) there is a treaty or 
convention for extradition and (2) a complaint is made under oath charging [the person 
sought to be extradited] with having committed in [the foreign country] any of the crimes 
provided for by such Treaty or Convention.”).  
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.   
 165. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972).   
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.   
 167. See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 788-89 (discussing why material witness warrants 
provide a useful analogy).   
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). 
 169. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]n 
application for a material witness warrant under § 3144 must establish probable cause to 
believe that (1) the witness’s testimony is material, and (2) it may become impracticable 
to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena.”); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 
933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. 627, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 
1976). 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000).  




extradited pursuant to the foreign government’s request for his or her 
extradition.171
This formulation is consistent with the governmental and individual 
interests at stake.  Under extradition treaties, the United States has a 
compelling interest in maintaining foreign relations by swiftly apprehending 
fugitives sought by a foreign government so that a proper determination 
can be made as to their extraditability.172  Conversely, the liberty interest 
of a fugitive in an extradition proceeding, which is considered sui generis, is 
not unqualified.  In other words, it is an interest already burdened by the 
fact that a foreign government has initiated criminal proceedings against 
him.  Therefore, at the provisional arrest stage, the object of the probable 
cause inquiry should be limited to the existence of a foreign warrant 
charging an extraditable offense.173
But even if a showing beyond the existence of the foreign warrant 
charging an extraditable offense is necessary to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment at the provisional arrest stage, what should be the nature of 
that showing?  The statutory scheme governing extradition requests “has 
never by its terms required an evidentiary submission as a predicate for 
the issuance of a provisional arrest warrant.”174  Further, Caltagirone 
and Russell, and to some degree, Sahagian, recognized that the probable 
cause showing underlying a provisional arrest warrant could be more 
 171. See Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[The extradition 
hearing is] essentially a ‘preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made 
out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding 
nation.’”).  While section 3184 does not mention probable cause, the court in Wiebe read 
that requirement into the statute.  See United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 
1984).  The material witness statute similarly does not identify probable cause as the 
standard governing the issuance of material witness warrants.  See also § 3144.  Courts 
interpreting that statute likewise have found that for a warrant to issue, there must be a 
determination of probable cause.  See Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 64; Bacon, 449 F.2d at 
943; Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 628. 
Under the Bail Reform Act, once arrested, a material witness may be released on 
personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond, released subject to certain 
conditions, or detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(c), (e) (2000).  In extradition cases, the Act 
is inapplicable and there is a presumption against bail which can be overcome if the 
person sought to be extradited demonstrates “special circumstances.”  Wright v. Henkel, 
190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903); In re Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986); In re 
Mironescu, 296 F. Supp. 2d 632, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
 172.  See Wiehl, supra note 10, at 790 (“The case can certainly be made that in 
extradition cases the government has interests that extend well beyond mere reciprocity.  
These interests include peace and commerce with other nations.”).   
 173. See Wiebe, 733 F.2d at 553-54; In re Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D. Tex. 
1957); see also In re Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A request 
for provisional arrest need only be accompanied by a declaration that an arrest warrant 
exists . . . .”).   
 174. Wiehl, supra note 10, at 744.   
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informal than the showing at the extradition hearing.175  This takes into 
account the realities of the extradition proceeding at that stage, when 
documents are being collected and prepared in connection with the 
presentation of the formal request for extradition leading to the 
extradition hearing.176  Specifically, a sworn complaint setting forth the 
facts alleged in the foreign warrant should be sufficient to enable the 
magistrate or judge to make a probable cause finding that the fugitive 
committed the charged offense for the limited purpose of his detention 
pending the extradition hearing.177
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment provides in part that “no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”178  Provisional arrest warrants issued pursuant to the request of a 
foreign government under an extradition treaty must comply with that 
constitutional command.  As demonstrated by the discussion above, 
given the nature of extradition proceedings, the object of the probable 
cause determination at the provisional warrant stage should be the existence 
 175. See Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 513 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988); Russell, 
805 F.2d at 1217; Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975).  See generally Nathaniel A. Persily, 
Note, International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 407, 416-17 
(1998) (“Though no court has specified it as such, the probable cause showing at the 
stage of provisional arrest is what might be termed a ‘second order’ probable cause 
showing.  The government is establishing probable cause that probable cause of 
criminality will be established at the extradition hearing.”). 
 176.  As noted by one commentator: 
Most extradition treaties specify a deadline following (rather than prior to) the 
fugitive’s arrest by which the requesting country must gather and transmit 
through the diplomatic channel the various charging documents, affidavits, 
ambassadorial or consular certifications, translations, and apostilles which the 
government will in turn submit to the court for consideration at a formal 
extradition hearing on the government’s request for an order certifying the 
extraditability of the fugitive. 
Wiehl, supra note 10, at 750.   
 177.  The form complaint found in the Department of Justice’s Criminal Resource 
Manual for provisional arrests contains a section for a description of the facts upon 
which the foreign warrant was based.  See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 4, § 
616; cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (“If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the 
complaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and 
that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer 
authorized to execute it.”).   
 178. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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of a foreign warrant charging an extraditable offense.  Even if the Fourth 
Amendment requires more, however, the showing should be less formal 
than that at the extradition hearing, and the facts alleged in the foreign 
warrant should be sufficient to support the detention of the fugitive 
pending the formal request for extradition and the subsequent hearing. 
 
